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Abstract: A deep disagreement is the result of clashing systems of underlying principles. Debate surrounding the
possibility of the resolution of deep disagreements is ongoing. I elucidate the notion of deep disagreements by
assuming their resolution is not precluded. I consider five disagreement resolution strategies offered by Steven
Hales. Though I conclude that these strategies are not viable for resolving a deep disagreement, my examination
allows me to identify certain key marks of an adequate solution.
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1. Introduction
In his 1985 “The Logic of Deep Disagreements” Robert Fogelin presents the idea of a deep
disagreement as a disagreement over which a clash of “underlying principles”(Fogelin, p. 5)1
precludes the conditions for rational resolution. There is ongoing discussion surrounding whether
deep disagreements are to be understood as absolutely unresolvable by definition.2 I make no
attempt to settle this discussion in this paper. Instead, I attempt to provide the reader with a better
understanding of deep disagreements by assuming that their resolution is not analytically
precluded and identifying certain necessary marks of said resolution. I draw out the distinction
between deep disagreements and normal disagreements in light of five strategies for rational
disagreement resolution put forward by Steven Hales in his 2014 “Motivations for Relativism as
a Solution to Disagreements.” I explain why none of these strategies (including, in opposition to
Hales, relativism) offers a viable strategy for the resolution of deep disagreements. While I do
not provide any alternative strategy for the resolution of deep disagreements, my examination
allows me to identify some conditions that any adequate solution to deep disagreements would
need to satisfy.
2. Deep Disagreements
Before considering the viability of adopting various disagreement strategies when faced with a
deep disagreement, I will elucidate the notion of deep disagreement itself by turning to Fogelin’s
description and some current writers on the subject. Deep disagreements are to be understood as
disagreements over which there can be no rational resolution – not because the speakers are
“Now when I speak about underlying principles, I am thinking about what others (Putnam) have called framework
propositions or what Wittgenstein was inclined to call rules. We get a deep disagreement when the argument is
generated by a clash of framework propositions” (Fogelin, p. 5).
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irrational, but because of a clash of “underlying principles” which has the result of precluding the
conditions for rational resolution.
Fogelin gives us two examples of deep disagreements, the abortion debate and the debate
surrounding affirmative action. Debates/discussions over these and similar disagreements, which
have to do with what Fogelin calls one’s “moral standing” (Fogelin, p. 7), are often entirely
fruitless, to the point where either interlocutor might conclude that the other is being
unreasonable, uncooperative or simply pigheaded. The idea of deep disagreements lends itself to
a more charitable understanding of one’s interlocutor. In a deep disagreement, we are faced with
disagreements over “a whole system of mutually supporting propositions (and paradigms,
models, styles of acting and thinking) that constitute, if I may use the phrase, a form of life”
(Fogelin, p. 6). Coming to understand disagreements over abortion, affirmative action, and other
similarly heated topics as disagreements which emerge from a clashing of systems of beliefs can
help account for the frustration one might associate with arguments about abortion (and other
topics) without pushing us to deem the other party unreasonable.
Jeremy Barris describes how, in a deep disagreement, the interlocutors will often fail to
recognize that the other is operating with a competing framework which includes radically
different meanings for terms which appear in either framework.
[In a deep disagreement] each [system of beliefs] is unintelligible to the other, and
the sense they typically do appear to each other to have is instead necessarily a
misconstrual resulting from assimilating the other’s statements to the inapplicable
criteria of the home framework (Barris, p. 370).
The misconstrual that Barris mentions is the source of the often-frustrating character of deep
disagreements. By taking for granted that one’s interlocutor understands a proposition in the
same way (or against the same background of beliefs) when discussing, for example, the nuances
of morality, one stacks the deck in favour of confusion and befuddlement.
As to the source of the disparity between conceptual frameworks, in his 2018 “On the
Pragmatics of Deep Disagreements,” Matthew Shields makes the case that deep disagreements
emerge out of an accumulation of divergent concepts that recur throughout what Fogelin calls
one’s system of underlying principles:
I want to suggest that we are well-served by construing deep disagreements as
disagreements over how to understand concepts because this approach gives us a
clear diagnosis for why our reasons appear to run out when faced with such
disagreements. (Shields, §1.2)
So, in the case of the abortion debate, the idea is that the disagreement might turn upon a
network of deep-seated beliefs related to the idea of personhood. In the case of the affirmative
action debate, the disagreement might turn upon a network of similarly deep-seated beliefs
related to one’s conception of fairness (Fogelin, pp. 6-7).
For those who believe in a supernatural conception of the spirit, or soul, bringing any
kind of biological arguments into the abortion debate might seem completely out of place, and
the biologist might be equally perplexed with supernatural explanations. Of course, this example
might be a bit misleading, because there is a very significant methodological asymmetry between
biological and supernatural claims. It is important to note that clashes of framework principles,
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which are the essential feature of deep disagreements, are not necessarily marked by this
asymmetry. To that end, I’d like to note that deep disagreements have elsewhere been likened to
a clash of Kuhnian paradigms (Shields, §1.2), so the idea of a wholly scientific deep
disagreements (or deep disagreement between scientists) is very much on the table.
One key feature of normal disagreements which is not present in the case of deep
disagreements is that the interlocutors are able to “agree on the method for resolving their
disagreement” (Fogelin, p. 3). I will interpret Fogelin’s use of the word “method” here broadly
enough to mean any sort of agreement on the sorts of things that would count as proof one way
or the other. Deep disagreements are cases where what would count as a means of arriving at a
resolution can’t be agreed upon. Fogelin puts it by saying that a deep disagreement is not to be
understood as a case where there is no solution available, or possible. Instead “it is the stronger
claim that the conditions for argument do not exist” (Fogelin, p. 5).
Scott Aikin picks up on this feature in his 2018 “Deep Disagreement and the Problem of
the Criterion.” Aikin describes deep disagreements with reference to Sextus’s famous problem,
wherein two interlocutors are faced with a regress of justifications for their reasons. Aikin writes,
In the same way that the problem of the criterion has mutually-cancelling necessary
conditions, so does the argumentative problem of deep disagreement.
(1) S has resolved a disagreement (about the acceptability of P) with H only if S has
provided dialectically satisfying arguments for H that P.
(2) S has provided dialectically satisfying arguments for H that P only if S has
resolved a disagreement with H (about the acceptability of C, as a criterion for the
acceptable resolution of P) (Aikin, §3).
This feature of deep disagreements is accounted for by Shields’ pragmatic reading of deep
disagreements. Indeed, the above quotation from Shields continues,
There is a close link between normative reasons—reasons in favor of holding a belief
or carrying out an action—and the concepts we have. One can only have a normative
reason to Φ or a normative reason to believe p if one also has the relevant concepts
implicated in the act of Φ-ing or in the proposition p. (Shields, §1.2)
One could provide many examples that demonstrate this key point, but I think one will suffice. If
I understand the word ‘left’ to have the exact same sense that most people attribute to the word
‘right,’ then not only will I consistently offer very poor directions to tourists, but I will come to
believe that other people do not know how to give directions.
Now that we are equipped with a basic understanding of deep disagreements as
disagreements, which arise a clash of framework principles, it will be helpful to contrast them
with the normal disagreements with which the reader is doubtlessly more familiar.
3. Some resolution strategies that simply won’t do
I will now turn my attention to distinguishing deep disagreements from normal disagreements by
looking at five disagreement resolution strategies considered by Steven Hales and explaining
why they fail as a resolution strategy for a deep disagreement. To be sure, Hales nowhere claims
that his list is an exhaustive list of possible resolution strategies. Still, I think that this list is
3

instructive when trying to better understand deep disagreements because each of the strategies
Hales considers can be broadly understood as being rational disagreement resolution strategies
and deep disagreements are understood as disagreements over which there can be no rational
resolution. So we will not here consider things like enforcement by an authority or the earth
exploding -- which could very well end the debate! As a result of this examination, I will identify
three key conditions of any adequate resolution to a deep disagreement.
The argument resolution strategies that will be considered are 1) arguing to the point of
capitulation, 2) arriving at a compromise, 3) identifying an ambiguity, 4) adopting Pyrrhonian
skepticism, and 5) adopting relativism. I will argue that none of these strategies are viable
resolution strategies for a deep disagreement. For his part, Hales advances the adoption of
relativism in a deep disagreement and I will explain why I disagree.
3.1. Capitulation
Arguing to the points of capitulation occurs when two interlocutors keep arguing until one
concedes that the other’s position is correct. If we end up agreeing on the same truth-value for
some proposition as a result of argumentation (rather than, I think, exhaustion, hunger or
torture), then we have argued to the point of capitulation (Hales, p. 64). I think it is fair to make
the claim that people often take this to be the default method of disagreement resolution in
normal disagreements.
Attempting to argue to the point of capitulation cannot be advised in the case of a deep
disagreement. So much so, in fact, that one might be inclined to define deep disagreements as
disagreements that cannot be settled by argument. But such a definition of deep disagreements
would be inadequate, for while it would be accurate in so far as it could be universally applied to
deep disagreements, it is too broad and mistakes the symptom for the disease. If one were to
define deep disagreements in opposition to arguing to the point of capitulation, then one would
omit the more fundamental feature of deep disagreements which is, crucially, the reason for this
fact -- a deep disagreement is a case where the clashing (or incommensurability) of each
interlocutor’s respective set of underlying principles has the effect of precluding agreement on
the conditions that would allow for the resolution of the disagreement to be achieved in the first
place. An effective resolution to a deep disagreement would need address these underlying
principles, instead of the single proposition at issue.
3.2. Compromise
There are two small cupcakes and two people very hungry people whose favourite source of
sustenance is cupcakes. Despite both parties’ desire to eat both cupcakes, a compromise is struck
and both parties end up with one cupcake. Compromise is a familiar, effective and useful
strategy to adopt in a disagreement. However, as I will show, any compromise at which we
arrive cannot be understood as a resolution to deep disagreements because, at best, it is armistice,
not peace.
Hales points to compromise as a strategy adopted in cases that, like deep disagreements,
appear utterly hopeless. Indeed, Hales directly relates compromise to disagreements over
abortion by providing the example of how
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an abortion conservative (who believes that all abortions, even of zygotes, is morally
impermissible) and an abortion liberal (who believes that all abortions, even of very
late term foetuses, is morally permissible) might settle their differences through
compromise on a moderate position. Perhaps they decide that early abortions are
morally permissible, late abortions are not, and that they can amicably work out the
middle-term boundary cases. (Hales, p. 64)
This example from Hales, I think, serves to highlight just why compromise cannot be looked to
as a legitimate resolution strategy for deep disagreements. While I think that Hales intends his
example to ring true to some degree, as Hales himself points out, those who believe themselves
to be in possession of the truth might not easily arrive at compromise when faced with a deeply
held moral conviction (Hales, p. 65). Recent legislation in Georgia, Alabama and other American
states (Al Jazeera) serve as a strong reminder that compromises are not long-term solutions.
Compromise is not about settling on the truth-value of the proposition or set of
propositions about which we disagree, but is instead about deciding what to do. It is, of course,
rational, because there is nothing in the notion of compromise which precludes us from making a
case in favour of our own position. So I can make arguments that can certainly sway the
outcome, as can you, but these are cases where we end up agreeing on some other proposition
than that over which we disagreed to begin with. After the disagreement is over, both
interlocutors can think of themselves as having been right, but being put at an impasse by the
other, who was wrong but at least willing to compromise. The interlocutors don’t end up
agreeing on what they think so much as agreeing on what to do. Valuable, to be sure, but
different. Ultimately, I think that a compromise is something we can arrive at despite a deep
disagreement, but it is not a resolution to the deep disagreement.
3.3. Ambiguity
We might resolve a disagreement by identifying an ambiguity in our respective uses of the terms
involved in the disputed proposition. The classic example, which is cited by Hales (p. 65), is
from William James who uncovers an ambiguity in order to settle a disagreement regarding
squirrel going round the tree exactly opposite a person walking round the tree. If we ask whether
the person has gone around the squirrel, then the correct answer depends upon whether we intend
going round the squirrel to means either from north, to east, to south, to west or from left, to
front, to right, to back. In the first case yes and in the second case no. Once the ambiguity has
been identified, the disagreement simply fizzles away (James, p. 24).
In addition to cases where the ambiguity is related to the terms involved in the
description of some proposition, Hales includes contextualism as a kind of ambiguity which is
related to the shifting meanings that a word or statement can have based on the setting in which it
used. On a contextualist understanding, apparent disagreements dissolve once we take into
account the context in which the statement is made (Hales, p. 66). One example is that, when
asked whether we would endorse someone’s knowing that arsenic is poisonous based on a single
utterance, the contextualist looks to the setting in which the utterance was made. The
contextualist claims that we can rightly claim to know that arsenic is poisonous in a casual
context, but not if we were unable to justify our assertion that arsenic is poison during an indepth graduate level biology exam on the effects of arsenic on humans (Rysiew, §1). Similarly, a
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strawberry may well be considered a berry in a casual context, but not in a conversation with a
botanist.
Ambiguities of either sort can be differentiated from arguing to the point of capitulation
on the grounds that once a person is made aware of the ambiguity, that person gets to save face,
so to speak, by saying “well it still looks like a square if you hold it like this” or something to
that effect. I think that this is key to the appeal of ambiguity, as it involves a collaborative
approach to disagreement resolution that sets all involved parties up for continued productive
discourse.
Sadly, this type of resolution really seems inapplicable to deep disagreements. It seems
appropriate to me to describe this kind of resolution as appealing to deeper level agreement
about underlying principles to resolve a surface level disagreement. I think that seeing
contextualism as a resolution strategy to deep disagreements amounts to affirming the
consequent in so far as one would have to make the jump from the (correct) statement “If there is
a resolution for a deep disagreement, then that disagreement’s resolution will have to do with
deeper level beliefs” to “This is a case of disagreement resolution which has to do with deeper
level beliefs, so it must be a resolution to a deep disagreement.”
Another objection to ambiguity as a resolution strategy, outlined by both Hales (p. 67)
and Francén (pp. 26-27), is that it doesn’t really do justice to the idea of disagreement. The
objection is that seeking out ambiguity amounts to pretending that there are not genuine
disagreements, that we were not disagreeing about that thing, but both saying true things about
different things. By way of contrast, a deep disagreement can be a case where I am saying A
(abortion is to be permitted), and you are saying not-A (abortion is not to be permitted), and I
understand your saying not-A just fine, while you understand my saying A just fine. Seeking out
ambiguity in cases such as these doesn’t seem to help.
3.4. Skepticism
The resolution strategy Hales calls “Pyrrhonian skepticism” (p. 67) is defined with reference to
“Sextus’s ‘Skeptic Way’ [of] suspending judgment without hope of leaving the state of
suspension” (Hales, p. 68). As a resolution strategy, the Pyrrhonian skeptic attempts to take a
seat outside of the disagreement, from which she might adjudicate it fairly (Hales, pp. 67-68). As
much as this might seem plausible, sensible or even laudable, we don’t really get the option to
stay in this state of suspension. Occasion to act is inevitable. Pyrrho walking off the cliff
demands that he come to a judgment to the effect that that thing approaching that appears to be
the edge of a cliff is, in fact, not the edge of a cliff, or is at least not to be treated as such.
There is certainly value to skepticism, in so far as it is contrasted with credulity, but the
kind of skepticism which would be relevant in a deep disagreement would be skepticism about
one’s own views (since a deep disagreement assumes ample skepticism towards the competing
view). Ultimately, I think that fallibilism is a more sensible epistemic stance than skepticism. I’m
inclined to endorse the pragmatist’s rejection of the idea that genuine doubt is the kind of thing a
person can decide to do. And, as a result of the methodological difficulties highlighted in Aikin’s
characterization of the problem of deep disagreements as a symmetrical version of the problem
of the criterion, the kinds of evidence with which an arguer is presented in a deep disagreement
cannot be assumed to necessitate (or even push her to) abandon her own position.
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3.5. Relativism
If you and I arrive at a relativistic resolution to a disagreement, then I come to view your claim
as true for you but false for me, while you come to view my claim as true for me but false for
you. A relativistic strategy for the resolution of a deep disagreement would involve
understanding the truth-value of whatever sentence over which we disagree as nothing more than
the value that that sentence receives relative to the series of sentences which happen to describe
either interlocutor’s world view. The resolution is supposed to be that I see that you are right
while I see that I am also right, but I now see your answer as sensible, as well reasoned, as
tenable, and so we stop arguing. Hales thinks this will work in the case of deep disagreement and
advances relativism as a viable resolution strategy to settle a debate between Jack (an atheist)
and Diane (a theist) who disagree over a proposition, P’, which asserts that souls are essential
characteristics of human beings:
The dispute between Jack and Diane is resolved by determining that P’ is both true
and false. P’ is true relative to Diane’s perspective, a perspective which includes as
an epistemological component the methodology of appeal to revelation, the Bible,
and its expert interpreters as a source of noninferential beliefs. P’ is false relative to
Jack’s perspective, the epistemology of which includes analytic rationalism. (Hales,
p. 81)
Relativism is sometimes likened to contextualism or ambiguity (e.g., Hales, p. 69,
Francén) because both settle the disagreement by 1) appealing to the system of beliefs which,
thereby, results in the disagreement; and 2) admitting that different conceptual schemes will lead
to the endorsement of different claims. The most obvious way that ambiguity and relativism can
be differentiated is by highlighting that ambiguity seems to indicate a way forward while
relativism just tells me that I’ve won a game of my own invention. While uncovering an
ambiguity allows me to understand that I do endorse your claim when I see it your way,
relativism makes the counterfactual claim that I would endorse your claim if I were to see it your
way – but the fact remains that I don’t.
Victoria Lavorerio offers a response to Hales on relativism as resolution strategy I take to
be convincing. Her primary objection to relativism is that it demands what calls the “impossible
epistemic judgement” (Lavorerio, §3) that each interlocutor grant legitimacy to claims derived
from a framework she views as false. The physicist will not be swayed by how methodologically
soundly a horoscope was written. The central point of Lavorerio’s objection to relativism as a
viable strategy to adopt when faced with a deep disagreement is that, without endorsing the
other’s conceptual framework, either party would still think of herself as right (Lavorerio, § 3).
For this reason, relativism posited as a resolution to deep disagreement amounts to little more
than the forfeiture of the possibility of disagreement resolution, the admission that we are at a
hopeless impasse.
4. Conclusion
Deep disagreements are understood as the clashing of incommensurable conceptual frameworks
or systems of belief. The preceding examination has been intended to serve as a means of
elucidating the distinction between a normal disagreement and a deep disagreement. I have
7

examined five disagreement resolution strategies and deemed none of them adequate in the face
of a deep disagreement. Throughout this examination, I have identified the following marks of
any satisfactory solution to a deep disagreement. Any adequate resolution for a deep
disagreement must 1) affect a change in the interlocutors’ respective conceptual frameworks, 2)
offer a long-lasting solution to the disagreement, and 3) involve the acknowledgement that the
disagreement is a real, rather than illusory disagreement.
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